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REPLY

JUSTICE THOMAS AND LECHMERE, INC. v.
NLRB: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR ROBERT A. GORMAN
Leonard Bierran*

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent article in this journal1 Professor Robert A. Gorman
attacked the U.S. Supreme Court's January 27, 1992 decision in the
case of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.2 Apart from the important principles
regarding union access to employer property which were announced
by the high court in that decision,3 the court's opinion received considerable attention because it was the first majority opinion authored
by the court's controversial4 new member, Justice Clarence Thomas.
Justice Thomas's opinion in the case, which held that employers
can broadly exclude non-employee union organizers from their property,' was quickly hailed in some quarters 6 as representing the high
Court's positive protection of private property rights and the sensitivity of the Court's newest member to such rights.' Professor Gorman,
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University. The
author served as a "special assistant" to Justice Thomas when he was Chairman of the
EEOC. The views expressed herein, however, in no way reflect those of either Justice
Thomas or the EEOC. The author thanks Professors Reginald Alleyne, Rafael Gely and Clyde
Summers for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J 1 (1991).
2. 112 S. CL 841 (1992).
3. See id.
4. See generally TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNrrZ, CAPITOL GAMES (1992).
5. 112 S. CL at 843-50.
6. See Paul M. Barrett & Arthur S. Hayes, Thomas Opinion Suggests His Leanings,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at B5.
7. Id.; see also LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA), Feb. 12, 1992, at 149-50 (statement of John
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however, did not see the decision in such a favorable light.
Professor Gorman states that Justice Thomas's opinion in
Lechmere erred on a number of counts. The decision primarily concerns the rights of non-employee union organizers to access employer
property. Professor Gorman argued that the Lechmere opinion erred
by limiting its analysis to whether or not non-union organizers had
alternative means of reaching the workers.' Professor Gorman agreed
with Justice White's dissenting opinion in the case9 which upheld the
National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) "accommodation" approach
to the issue.
Under the NLRB approach,1" a variety of factors are considered
when determining whether outside union organizers may gain access
to employer property, including, the degree of "openness" or
"closedness" of the property involved. Professor Gorman supported
this line of analysis, arguing that a shopping mall parking lot of the
kind in the Lechmere case is "freely accessible" to the public and
should be accorded less "property rights" protection than, for instance,
the inside of a somewhat secluded manufacturing plant.1
Professor Gorman also chastises Justice Thomas's opinion for its
failure to defer to the NLRB's "35 years of accumulated experience
in addressing the issue of non-trespassory communication by union
organizers," 12 particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 3 which
mandates general judicial deference to agency action. Professor
Gorman disputed Justice Thomas's assertion that the relevant statutory
language was sufficiently clear with regard to the rights of non-employee union organizers so as to obviate the need for judicial deference to the NLRB, 4 calling this assertion by Justice Thomas, "little
short of mind-boggling."' 5 According to Professor Gorman, Congress
in the National Labor Relations Act "says not a word remotely bear-

S. Irving, former NLRB General Counsel).
8. See Gorman, supra note 1, at 10-14.
9. 112 S. Ct. at 850-53 (White, L, dissenting).
10. This approach was most directly enunciated by the NLRB in the case of Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
11. See Gorman, supra note 1, at 13.
12. See id at 14-18 & n.68.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847-48.
15. Gorman, supra note 1, at 15.
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ing upon the issue of employer private-property rights."' 6 Thus, in
Professor Gorman's opinion, 17 the NLRB's policy and factual determinations in this area should be entitled to great deference. Gorman
further argues that if the Supreme Court wanted to reject the Board's
"balancing" approach, they should have remanded the case to the
NLRB for reconsideration in light of the Court's single-factor analysis
rather than simply proceeding to evaluate the facts on its own. 8
What is striking, though, about both Professor Gorman's analysis
of, and Justice Thomas's opinion in Lechmere, is the lack of broad
historical context and regulatory perspective. While both the Thomas
opinion"' and Gorman critique' generally trace the history of direct
union access to employer property, neither examines the Lechmere
decision in the context of the broad mosaic of rules governing union
organizing, specifically, the "home visits doctrine", 2' the Excelsior
doctrine,' and the rights of "off duty" employees.2 3 Moreover, neither Justice Thomas nor Professor Gorman discuss the proposed Labor
Law Reform Act of 1977-78 which passed the U.S. House of Representatives but was successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate, and
which addressed some of the various issues at bar in Lechmere from
a number of perspectives.24
The Lechmere decision has important implications on the "home
visits doctrine", the Excelsior doctrine, and on the rights of "off duty"
employees. Lechmere puts pressure on Congress to again consider the
reforms which were part of the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of
1977-78. This response is an attempt to develop some of the important implications of the Lechmere decision which were not meaningfully addressed by Professor Gorman in his critique of Justice
Thomas's opinion.

16. Id.
17. IL at 17.
18. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849-50.
19. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845-48.
20. Gorman, supra note 1, at 3-7.
21. See Peoria Plastics Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957); Plant City Welding & Tank Co.,
119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957).
22. See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
23. See generally Ke-Ching Drury, Comment, Right of Off-Duty Employees to Enter and
Remain on Employer Premises for OrganizationalPurposes, 54 B.U. L. REV. 199 (1974).
24. See Labor Reform Act, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2467, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see also Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free
Speech and Equal access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979)
[hereinafter "Penn Comment"].
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. Republic Aviation, Babcock, "Captive Audiences" and Nutone
The rules governing labor organizing at the workplace are
fraught with an inherent underlying conflict between the rights of
employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations under section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act" and the right of employers as
property owners and managers. 26 One of the key early cases addressing this conflict is the United States Supreme Court's 1945 decision
in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.27 In this case the Court made a
sharp distinction between workplace organizing during work time and
that conducted during nonwork time. The Court held that employer
rules prohibiting union activity during work time are presumptively
valid, while such rules when applied to nonwork time are presumptively invalid.28
The Supreme Court in Republic Aviation did not make any distinction between employee organizers and non-employee organizers,
and the NLRB subsequently afforded both groups broad freedom to
organize at the workplace during nonworking hours.29 The Court,
however, in its seminal decision eleven years later in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,' sharply reversed the NLRB on this issue and
strongly differentiated between the workplace organizing rights of
employees and non-employee or outside union organizers." Babcock
is the precedent directly underpinning Justice Thomas's opinion in
Lechmere 2
The Supreme Court in Babcock held that employers were free to
deny access to their property and the workplace to outside/non-employee union organizers so long as "reasonable efforts through other
available channels of communication" would enable the union to

25. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
26. See generally Leonard Bierman, Toward A New Model For Union Organizing: The
Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1985).
27. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
28. Id at 801-05 & nn.8 & 10.
29. See Jay Gresham, Still as Strangers: Non-employee Union Organizers on Private
Commercial Property, 62 TEx. L. REV. 111, 117 (1983).
30. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
31. Id. at 112-14.
32. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 845-50 (1992).
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303

reach employees with its message. 33 The Court in Babcock emphasized that in that case a large percentage of the company's employees
lived in a nearby small town, and as a result those employees were
reasonably accessible to the union at their homes and through other
means,
thus obviating the need for union access to employer proper34
ty.
The Republic Aviation and Babcock cases set forth the proposition that employers can develop general rules prohibiting on-site
solicitation by outside union organizers, and any union solicitation
during working time. They do not address, however, the question of
how these rights might be impacted by an employer's decision to
wage a vigorous campaign against a union at the work-site during
working time. This question has arisen most frequently in the context
of an employer's decision to give a "captive audience" speech, i.e.,
an anti-union speech given to all gathered employees at the workplace
during working time. Various observers have characterized such
speeches as perhaps the most potent weapon in an employer's antiunion arsenal.35
For this and related reasons, the NLRB has at times in the past
found such "captive audience" speeches to violate the Labor Act3 6 or
required employers who choose to make such speeches to give the
requisite union the opportunity to come onto company premises to
reply. 37 Later NLRB cases, though, have denied unions any
workplace reply to employer speeches of this kind,38 and this general approach was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1958
decision in NLRB v. United Steelworkers ("Nutone").39 In Nutone,
the Supreme Court held that an employer can lawfully enforce a
workplace no-solicitation rule against unions while at the same time
"violating" this policy by engaging in anti-union solicitation at times
and places prohibited by the rule.40 Citing Babcock,41 the Court

33. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
34. Id. at 106-07.
35. See Penn Comment, supra note 24, at 780 (citing statement by Professor Howard
Lesnick); see also Robert Lewis, The Law and Strategy of Dealing with Union Organizing
Campaigns, 25 LAB. L.J. 42, 46 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804-05 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373
(2d Cir. 1947).
37. See, e.g., Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
38. See, e.g., Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
39. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).

40. Id. at 358, 364.
41.

Id. at 363.
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noted that under the National Labor Relations Act unions have other
available avenues of communication, and they are not "entitled to use
a medium of communication simply because the employer is using
it."42 However, Justice Felix Frankfurter writing for the Court in
Nutone, recognized that employers were not free to implement rules
in this manner where a substantial "imbalance in the opportunities for
organizational communication" exist."'
B. The Home Visits Doctrine
The NLRB in the late 1950's, in apparent partial response to
some of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions limiting union organizational opportunities, developed its so-called "home visits doctrine."
Under this doctrine, unions are allowed to campaign by visiting employees at their homes, while employers are prohibited from engaging
in this method of campaigning.
The Board's differentiation between unions and employers in this
regard rests on two prongs. First, the NLRB has found employer
campaign visits to employee homes to be per se coercive," and has
stated that unions are never in the position of "control over tenure of
employment and working conditions" of the kind which imparts the
coercive effect to employer home visits.45
Second, and far more significantly, the NLRB has also held that
unions should be allowed to visit employee homes while employers
are not so permitted in order to offset the lack of union access to
employees at the workplace and in other contexts."' It is this latter
prong concerning the need for union home visits to offset employer
organizational advantages which has over time emerged as the major
underlying theme of the "home visits doctrine."4'
C. Excelsior/GeneralElectric
The notion of union home visits as an "organizational counterbalance" to employer advantages in reaching employees at the workplace
was further solidified by the NLRB in its famous 1966 holdings in

42. Id. at 364.
43. Id. at 362.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See

Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 548 (1957).
Plant City Welding and Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34 (1957).
id. at 133.
generally Bierman, supra note 26.
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the companion cases of Excelsior Underwear, Inc. 48 and General
Electric Co. 49 In General Electric, unions sought greater access to
employees at the worksite, particularly the ability to directly respond
to employer "captive audience" speeches.5" The Board, however,
while refusing to grant unions such workplace access, did hold in
Excelsior that unions would within seven days of Board's ordering of
a representation election be provided with a list of names and addresses for all employees in the given election unit.51
The Excelsior decision was clearly intended to facilitate the
ability of unions to contact employees at home, thereby offsetting
employer organizational advantages at the workplace.5 2 Yet the question remains whether the ability to engage in home visits really offsets employer communication advantages at the workplace. In General
Electric, the NLRB ruled that broader union organizational access
issues should be deferred "until after the affects of Excelsior become
known."'s3 Yet, it is now over a quarter-century since these cases
were decided, and the NLRB has never squarely reconsidered this
issue.

D. Proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-7854
Congress did attempt to step into the breach left by the Excelsior
and General Electric cases in the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of
1977-78."5 The introduced legislation contained various proposals designed to broaden union organizational access to employees.56
Among these proposals was legislative language which would have
essentially overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Nutone and
provided outside union organizers with the opportunity to respond at
the worksite to all employers workplace anti-union campaigning, 7 as
well as language permitting union workplace replies to employer

48. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
49. 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
50. Id. at 1250.
51. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.
52. Id. at 1246 n.27.
53. General Electric, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1251.
54. Labor Reform Act, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., IstSess. (1977); S. 2467 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978).
55. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
56. See Bierman, supra note 26, at 20-22.

57. Id.
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"captive audience" speeches.58 In tandem with these legislative proposals calling for increased union access to employees, Republican
members of the House of Representatives offered an amendment to
overrule the NLRB's "home visits doctrine" and allow employers to
campaign by visiting employees at their homes. 59 Some House Dem6
ocrats chastised this proposal as the "trick or treat" amendment,
while other members of Congress questioned whether either unions or
employers should be permitted to campaign by visiting employees at
their homes.6' Ultimately, the proposed "home visits" amendment
was tabled,62 and the entire proposed legislation died on June 22,
1978 when Senate Democrats failed to break a filibuster by Senate
Republicans on the legislation. 63
I. LECHMERE AND UNION ORGANIZATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
The Supreme Court's strong endorsement of the Babcock &
Wilcox distinction between employee and non-employee organizers in
Lechmere sharply limits the abilities of unions to reach employees at
the worksite. 4 While it is not completely unknown for unions to
have experienced outside union organizers "hire into" a targeted
workplace,6 5 absent such "trojan horses" the Lechmere decision essentially prevents non-employee union organizers from reaching employees at the workplace. Instead, unions must reach employees outside the worksite, with visits to employee's homes being among the
most important of these alternative union campaign methods. The
question then becomes whether such alternative union campaign methods are truly effective, or whether they, as Professor Gorman might
put it,' really "trivialize" the section 7 right of employees to learn
about the union.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 22-23.

60.

Id. at 22.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
Horse:
66.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 22; see also Penn Comment, supra note 24, at 795.
Lechrmere v. NLRB, 112 S. CL 841, 844, 849 (1992).
See Bierman, supra note 26, at 30; see generally Judd H. Lees, Hiring the Trojan
The Union Business Agent as a Protected Applicant, 42 LAB. L.J. 814 (1991).
See Gorman, supra note 1, at 20.
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IV. LECHMERE AND THE "HOME VisaTs DoCTRINE"

One obvious implication of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lechmere is to further increase the importance of the "home visits
doctrine" and the importance of the union home visit as an organizational "counterbalance" to employer opportunities to reach employees
at the workplace. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lechmere specifically
discusses attempts by the instant union to make home visits, and
notes that unions can reach employees via home visits instead of
reaching them at the workplace (which the Lechmere decision forcefully prohibits).67 Practitioners commenting on the Lechmere decision
have also directly noted that the decision is going to lead to a greater
emphasis on union home visitation,"s although Professor Gorman

surprisingly fails to discuss this issue in his piece.69
The "home visits doctrine" is flawed and needs to be overturned
by Congress. Thus, to the extent the Supreme Court's decision in
Lechmere further solidifies this doctrine the decision is also flawed
and needs to be overturned. Moreover, as one leading management
labor lawyer has put it, while Justice Thomas's opinion in Lechmere
is "very direct" and "straightforward",7" the decision lacks a comprehensive understanding of the day-to-day realities of union organizing
and of the broader legal framework under which union organizing
exists. Thus, while Professor Gorman may have not fully developed
the Lechmere decision's impact on the "home visits" and other doctrines, his overall assessment of the decision as representing a "mechanical approach" to the law may well be correct."
The "home visits doctrine" is flawed from two perspectives.
First, as Professor Gorman insightfully pointed out in his piece, we
live in a society considerably different from that which existed in the

67. Lechmere, 112 S. CL at 844, 849.
68. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, Access of Nonemployee Union Organizers to Private
Property, LAB. L. REP. INSIGHT (CCH), No. 287, Issue 66, (Mar., 1992) at 2 (Statement of
Mr. Hugh Hafer).
69. Professor Gorman's failure to discuss this issue is especially surprising since it is
one which has commanded considerable attention from his mentor and labor law casebook
co-author professor and former Harvard University President Derek C. Bok. See Derek C.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 95, 97, 100-01, 105 (1964); ARCHIBALD COX ET
AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (11th ed. 1991).
70. See LAB. REL WEEK (BNA), supra note 7, at 150 (statement of John S. Irving).
71. Gorman, supra note 1, at 10.
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late 1950's when the "home visits doctrine" was developed and the
Supreme Court decided Babcock & Wilcox.72 It must be remembered
that the Supreme Court's decision in Babcock turned in significant
degree on the fact that forty percent of the company's employees
lived in a small town only one mile from the jobsite, and thus were
arguably accessible to the union off working premises.7 3
Today, however, unlike the late 1950's, employees tend to live
scattered over a wide area.74 The interstate highway system, in particular, has made it the norm for many present-day employees to
drive considerable distances to their workplace. 7" Therefore it is fair
to say, as other observers have also pointed out,76 that current employee residential patterns make it harder for unions to reach employees at their homes today than it was three or four decades ago.
Ironically, Justice Thomas, in Lechmere specifically points out
that the employees in that case live spread out over a large metropolitan area (Greater Hartford).' Justice Thomas then goes on, however, to hold that "that fact does not in itself render them
'inaccessible' in the sense contemplated by Babcock."' However, he
in no way ties this to the history of the "home visits doctrine" or the
residential patterns existing in the 1950's such as in Babcock (which
he does discuss earlier in his opinion).79
Moreover, even if a union organizer does indeed reach employees at their homes, it seems a bit foolhardy to think that such campaign visits effectively "counterbalance" the employer's ability to
reach employees at the workplace."0 As Professor Howard Lesnick
has insightfully pointed out, when an employer gathers his employees
for a group meeting on paid company time to deliver a "captive
audience" anti-union speech, he is implicitly telling them that he cares
more about their position on unionization than about their work.8"
However, unlike at the workplace, no person can be a "captive audi-

72. Id. at 12.
73. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106 (1956).
74. See JUIus GERmAN, ET AL, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECONS:
TY 94-95 (1976).
75. See Bierman, supra note 26, at 10.
76. See GETMMA,
GOLDBERG & HERMAN, supra note 74, at 94-95.
77. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 849 (1992).
78. Id
79. See id at 845.
80. See Bierman, supra note 26, at 13-15.
81. See Penn Comment, supra note 24, at 780 & n.148.
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ence" in his or her own home.12 At home, employees may be distracted by numerous other responsibilities and relationships, and may,
as one observer has put it, simply wish to "compartmentalize" their
lives and forget about what goes on at work.13 The recent advent of
the two-worker family 4 may further increase the desire for such

"compartmentalization."1

Thus, even apart from whether unions find home visits to be an
effective organizing technique, such home visits may represent a
significant encroachment on employee privacy rights."5 This is one
of the considerable ironies of the Lechmere decision, for while the
decision is being hailed as one exemplifying the high court's sensitivity to "property rights",8 6 it protects employer property rights only at
the considerable expense of employee property rights. Employees are
now going to have more union organizers knocking at their front
doors. Aside from the fact that employees should arguably have the
right to be left alone at home, the underlying premise of the "home
visits doctrine," that employer home visits are intimidating while
union home visits are not8 7 is a bit disingenuous. One need only
read some of the recent work by Professor Clyde W. Summers and
others regarding organized crime infestation of certain unions to come
to the conclusion that home visits by officials of some unions might
be quite intimidating. 8 Finally, while the Supreme Court has in other contexts emphasized the value of door-to-door solicitation as a
method of promoting free speech, 9 Professor Derek Boko argues
that these precedents are not binding in any legal sense because labor
election home visits can be successfully differentiated from the sale of
encyclopedias or life insurance and other such door-to-door solicita-

82. See Gresham, supra note 29, at 159 n.276.
83. L at 159.
84. The author is indebted to his colleague Professor Stuart A. Youngblood for this insight. Also, the parents of teenage workers may simply forbid them from talking to union
organizers.
See Gorman, supra note 1, at 8.
85. See Bierman, supra note 26, at 18-20.
86. See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
88. See Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 689 (1991); see also, Randy M. Mastro, Steven C. Bennett & Mary P. Donlevy,
Private Plaintiffs' Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO Statute: A Means to Reform
Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 571 (1991).
89. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
90. See, Bok, supra note 69, at 100.
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tions.91
The "home visits doctrine" is flawed both from the perspective
that given the demographics of today it is a relatively ineffective
organizing technique, and that it unduly encroaches on employee
privacy and property rights. Although Professor Gorman did not develop the impact of th- Lechmere decision on the "home visits," the
decision's impact on the doctrine is clear and explicitly developed by
Justice Thomas in his opinion. By sharply foreclosing union access to
all employer property (including shopping center parking lots open to
the public at large) unions are going to be increasingly forced into
using the flawed home visits approach. This issue is ripe for careful
re-consideration by Congress.
V. LECHMERE AND THE "ExCELSIOR DocmnE"

While only parenthetically mentioned in a footnote by Professor
Gorman and nowhere directly discussed by Justice Thomas, the
Lechmere decision has important implications for the so-called "Excelsior doctrine," and it starkly underscores the flaws in that doctrine.
As noted above,93 unions are, pursuant to Excelsior, given a list of
employee names and addresses seven days after a labor representation
election has been scheduled.
Such elections are not scheduled, however, until the union has
already provided the NLRB with evidence that at least thirty percent
of the employees in the given bargaining unit are interested in being
represented by the union.94 Moreover, most unions, for strategic purposes, do not seek to schedule such elections until at least fifty percent of the given employees have expressed such interest.95 Thus,
during the entire early stage of an organizing campaign when a union
is trying to garner enough support to have an election scheduled the
union simply has no rights under Excelsior.
This situation is dramatically illustrated in the Lechmere case
itself where union organizers were forced to stand on a public grassy
strip next to a busy highway and record the license plate numbers of

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Under

See Gresham, supra note 29, at 160.
See Gorman, supra note 1, at 18 n.71.
See supra notes 48 to 53 and accompanying text.
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1991).
See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776 n.22 (1983).
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cars parked in the parking lot (from which they were excluded).9 6
Then, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the union apparently had
a "mole" at the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles who gave
them the names and addresses of the individuals who owned these
cars. 97 Through this method the U.S. Supreme Court in Lechmere
noted that the union was ultimately able to obtain the valid names
and addresses of about twenty percent of the employees it was trying
to organize and to send mailings to them and to reach some of them
by phone and by way of home visits. 98 Justice Thomas in Lechmere
then noted the union's "success" in reaching employees in this manner, and the fact that union had "reasonable access" to employees of
a kind which offset employer worksite access to employees and obviated the union's need to reach employees by coming onto employer
private property. 99
Justice Thomas's conclusions as to union "success" and "access"
are open to dispute, and the Lechmere decision supports Professor
William Gould's contention that the rights afforded unions under
Excelsior may be too little, too late."° Even through its assiduous
(some may say "pathetic") efforts involving recording employee license plates, the union only obtained the names and addresses of
about twenty percent of the workforce.' Indeed, in the Lechmere
case the union never even got to the point where a representation
election was formally scheduled - and Excelsior rights were triggered. 1"
An earlier "triggering" of Excelsior rights (perhaps when a union
has demonstrated a ten percent showing of interest) would address
this problem." 3 The somewhat pathetic picture painted in Lechmere
of union organizers standing on a dangerous grassy strip next to a
busy highway copying auto license plates so that through the "cooperation" of someone at the motor vehicles department they could get

96. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. CL 841, 844 (1992).
97. 1L
98. IL
99. 1L at 849-50.
100. See William B. Gould, Recent Developments Under the National Labor Relations
Act: The Board and the Circuit Courts, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 507 n.35 (1981).
101. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 844.
102. Id. Apparently the union's efforts resulted in only one signed authorization card. Id.
103. See Bierman, supra note 26, at 28-30. For further refinements of this general framework see Randall J. White, Union Representation Election Reform: Equal Access and the
Excelsior Rule, 67 IND. L.. 129 (1991).
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employee names and addresses,"° should help heighten recognition
of the flaws in the Excelsior doctrine as it currently stands, and perhaps help prompt reform in this area.
VI. LECHMERE AND "OFF-DUTY" EMPLOYEES

The Lechmere decision may also focus closer attention on the
rights of "off-duty" employees in the organizing context, and force
unions to try to make greater use of such employees in their organizing efforts. Over the years there has been some confusion regarding
the scope of organizational access afforded such employees pursuant
to the Supreme Court's holdings in Babcock and Republic Aviation."5 In the 1973 case of GTE Lenkurt, Inc., ° the NLRB likened the status of off-duty employees to that of non-employees, and
held that they would be subject to the same workplace organizing restrictions as non-employees. Three years later, however, in the case of
Tri-County Medical Center, Inc.,"°7 the Board shifted its views and
developed what appears to be its current position on the issue."' 8
Under Tri-County, "off-duty" employees are given significantly greater
rights of organizational access than non-employees, and are permitted
to engage in union organizational activity so long as such activity is
conducted outside "the interior of the plant and other working areas." 1°

Thus, Professor Gorman seems correct, at least under current
NLRB doctrine (although this would not have been the case under
GTE Lenkurt), that the Lechmere decision does not limit the ability of
an "off-duty" employee to place "a handbill under the windshield
wiper of an automobile known to belong to a fellow employee."'' t
Unlike non-employees, who pursuant to Lechmere are completely excluded from employer-owned parking lots, "off-duty" employees are
under Tri-County permitted to engage in organizational activity in
such areas. Professor Gorman does not explore whether the Lechmere
decision will force unions to make greater use of "off-duty" and other

104. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 844.
105. See generally Bierman, supra note 26, at 32-33; White, supra note 103, at 138 n.61.
106. 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
107. 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Southern Maryland Hospital Center, 293 N.L.R.B. 1209, 1221 (1989); Great
Dane Trailers Indiana, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 384, 387 (1989).
109. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
110. See Gorman, supra note 1, at 21.
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similarly situated employees (which it seems it would), or whether the
NLRB's position regarding the rights of "off-duty" employees should
perhaps be reformed in light of the Supreme Court's Lechmere decision.
With respect to the latter question, at least one commentator has
argued that the interior versus exterior off-duty employee workplace
access "compromise" fashioned by the NLRB in Tri-County is a
rather artificial one."1 More specifically, if the concern regarding
off-duty employee organizational access is one based on protection of
employer property rights, the theory developed in both Lechmere and
Babcock as the justification for keeping non-employee organizers off
employer premises, then off-duty employees should simply be treated
like non-employees and barred from the work premises. 1
On the other hand, if Republic Aviation-type managerial interests
are being protected, then there should be no differentiation between
off-duty employees and on-duty employees who are permitted to
engage in union organizing activity inside the workplace but only in
nonworking areas during nonworking time. 13 Under Tri-County
though, managerial interests are advanced to prohibit individuals who
have already been admitted onto the property from talking to fellow
workers in contexts which would appear to present little real threat to
managerial integrity. 1 4 Given the Lechmere decision's sharp proscriptions against non-employee access to employer property, a relaxation of the standards governing access rights of off-duty employees
the same rights as on-duty employees may well be apgiving them
115
propriate.
Finally, one implication of the Lechmere decision is that unions
will try and make greater use of both sympathetic on-duty and offduty employees in an attempt to reach workers at the worksite. Some
observers have questioned whether such "untrained" employees can
convey the union's appeal with anything comparable to the effectiveness of professional union organizers. 6 One way around this problem for unions may, in light of Lechmere, be to attempt to have

11. See Sarah Kom, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by
Nonemployee Union Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 380 n.40 (1984).
112. Id.
113. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
114. See Korn, supra note 111, at 380 n.40.
115. See generally Bierman, supra note 26, at 33.
116. See Gresham, supra note 29, at 153-54; see also NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's,
Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1967).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 10:1

experienced union organizers "hire into" a workplace targeted for
union organization."' The relevant legal standards governing attempts by unions to "hire in" such "trojan horses" have recently been
the subject of much controversy,"1 which is likely to increase in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere.
VII. LECHMERE AND CONGRESSIONAL LABOR LAW REFORM

The Lechmere decision strongly reinforces the basic union organizational "blueprint" developed by the NLRB in 1966 Excelsior/General Electric companion cases. Under this blueprint, unions are
prohibited from coming onto the employer's property and must reach
employees outside of the workplace. When the NLRB decided these
cases it stated that it would defer any significant shift in these organizing parameters until after the affect of the cases "became
known". 119 Now, almost three decades later, the affects of these decisions seem fairly clear. Unions, for a variety of demographic and
other reasons, have not found their ability to engage in home visits to
be a particularly effective counterbalance to the ability of employers
to reach workers at the workplace.12 For these and other reasons
the percentage of the private sector workforce which is unionized has
fallen to recent lows. 2 ' In Lechmere, the Supreme Court rebuffed
the NLRB's attempt to even modestly alter the rules of the game in
the favor of unions by giving unions access to shopping center parking lots generally open to the public. Thus the time seems quite ripe
for Congress to step into the breach, as it attempted to do with the
proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78.
While the precise parameters of congressional reform need to be
developed, reform is needed to provide unions with greater organizational opportunities and access to employees.'22 Absent such reform,
the rights afforded workers under section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act will, as Professor Gorman might put it, become ever117. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
118. See Lees, supra note 65.
119. See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); General Elec. Co., 156
N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
120. See generally Bierman, supra note 26.
121. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, Union Members in
1990, USDL 91-34, (Feb. 6, 1991), in LAB. L. REP. INSIGHT (CCH), No. 234, Issue 54, Mar.
1991, at 1. Overall union membership currently stands at 16.1 percent of the envelope with
private sector membership standing at 12.1 percent. Id.
122. See generally Penn Comment, supra note 24; Bierman, supra note 26.
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increasingly "trivialized."" 2
VIII. CONCLUSION

Professor Gorman in his recent article in this journal does outline
many of the problems with Justice Thomas's opinion in the Lechmere
case. In many respects, though, Professor Gorman's analysis of the
case does not dig deep enough. For the Lechmere decision not only
undercuts traditional judicial deference to administrative expertise, but
it also strongly reinforces earlier precedents which have made it extremely difficult for unions to effectively organize employees. The
decision's impact on the "home visits doctrine" is particularly deleterious. The Lechmere decision should spark renewed congressional
consideration of broad-scale reforms of the union organizing law
similar to those proposed in the 1977-78 Labor Law Reform Act.

123.

See Gornan, supra note 1, at 20.
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